德国《汽车周刊》8月18日报道，诺基亚起诉戴姆勒侵权一案，德国地方法院判决戴姆勒败诉，要求戴姆勒购买诺基亚专利使用权，还要支付高昂的罚金。
8月19日，诺基亚宣布，已获得德国曼海姆一家法院针对戴姆勒联网汽车未经授权使用诺基亚专利技术的全国性禁令（case no. 2 O 34/19，专利号 EP2981103）。
从去年起，戴姆勒和诺基亚就技术专利问题摩擦不断，诺基亚指责戴姆勒不肯支付诺基亚专利授权费，戴姆勒认为诺基亚垄断通讯技术。诺基亚向德国曼海姆地方法院起诉戴姆勒。
8月18日，曼海姆地方法院判决认为，戴姆勒涉嫌侵权侵犯诺基亚的一项专利，戴姆勒可能要为此付出罚金。但是，法院否决了诺基亚的其他起诉。
戴姆勒表示，会继续上诉，预计不会因此中止涉嫌侵权的汽车生产和销售。
目前，判决尚未生效。诺基亚如果想要判决尽快生效，需要支付保证金。
诺基亚技术总裁詹尼卢坎德（Jenni Lukander）对这个判决表示欢迎，说：“我们希望，戴姆勒现在可以履行他们的责任，购买使用许可。我们合作才能双赢”。
根据诺基亚，戴姆勒拒绝与诺基亚签署专利使用授权，而其他车企都与诺基亚达成协议，使用诺基亚的通讯技术专利。
戴姆勒则认为，诺基亚的专利使用授权系统向汽车公司出售，但要求汽车供应商按照产品单独支付专利使用费用，涉嫌垄断，使用不正当手段收费，戴姆勒要求欧盟反垄断组织对此进行调查。
但是，德国法官并不认可戴姆勒的观点，认为戴姆勒和合作伙伴并没有以公平的条件与诺基亚签署授权合同。
下附裁判摘要：
Nokia v Daimler
18 August 2020 - Case No. 2 O 34/19
A. Facts
The claimant is part of the Nokia group with headquarters in Finland (Nokia). Nokia is a major provider of telecommunication services and holds a significant portfolio of patents declared as (potentially) essential to the practice of various wireless telecommunication standards (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs) developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
The defendant, Daimler, is a German car manufacturer with a global presence. Daimler produces and sells cars in Germany with connectivity features which implement standards developed by ETSI.
Nokia declared the patent involved in the present case as essential for the 4G/LTE Standard towards ETSI. ETSI requires patent holders to commit to make patents that are or might become essential to the practice of a standard accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions.
On 21 June 2016, Nokia informed Daimler about its SEP portfolio by providing a list containing all patents and patent applications which Nokia declared as (potentially) essential towards ETSI. Daimler responded that a licence could be taken under the condition that its products actually infringe Nokia's patents.
On 9 November 2016, Nokia made a first licensing offer to Daimler. On 7 December 2016, Nokia shared further information regarding its patent portfolio with Daimler. On 14 December 2016, Daimler replied that it would be more efficient to license its suppliers manufacturing the so-called 'Telematics Control Units' (TCU), which are built into Daimler's cars. From January 2017 until February 2019, Daimler did not engage in further negotiations with Nokia and also refrained from participating in discussions which Nokia had with Daimler's suppliers.
On 27 February 2019, Nokia made a second licensing offer to Daimler to which further claim-charts mapping its patents to the relevant parts of the affected standards were attached. On 19 March 2019, Daimler rejected this offer as well, basically, by arguing that the royalties for Nokia's portfolio should be calculated on basis of the components provided to Daimler by its suppliers and not the cars produced by Daimler.
Subsequently, Nokia filed several infringement actions against Daimler before the District Courts of Munich, Duesseldorf and Mannheim in Germany.
On 9 May 2019, shortly after the infringement proceedings were initiated, Daimler made a counteroffer to Nokia. Basis for the calculation of the royalties for Nokia's portfolio was the average selling price for TCUs paid by Daimler to its suppliers. Nokia rejected this counteroffer.
On 10 June 2020, Daimler made a second counteroffer to Nokia. Nokia would be able to unilaterally determine the licensing fees (in accordance with Sec. 315 of the German Civil Code). Daimler would, however, have the right to contest the fee determined before court. The second counteroffer was also rejected.
On 18 June 2020, the German Federal Cartel Office (Cartel Office) intervened in the present proceedings before the District Court of Mannheim (Court) and recommended that the Court referred certain questions concerning the nature of the FRAND commitment to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The Court did not follow the recommendation of the Cartel Office.
With the present judgment [1] (cited by www.juris.de), the Court granted an injunction against Daimler and also recognised Daimler's liability to pay damages on the merits. The Court further ordered Daimler to render accounts and provide information necessary for the calculation of damages to Nokia.
B. Court's reasoning
The Court found that Daimler infringed the patent-in-suit [2] . For this reason, Nokia was entitled -among other claims- to injunctive relief [3] .
Daimler and its suppliers that joined the proceedings asserted so-called 'FRAND-defences', arguing that by filing infringement actions, Nokia had abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and should, therefore, be denied an injunction. In particular, it was argued that Nokia had failed to comply with the conduct requirements established by the CJEU in the matter Huawei v ZTE [4] (Huawei decision, or framework).
The Court dismissed the FRAND-defences raised by Daimler and its suppliers as unfounded [5] .
Huawei framework
The Court made clear that SEP holders are not per se prevented from enforcing the exclusivity rights arising from their patents Ibid, para. 146. The fact that a patent is standard essential does not mean that the patent holder is obliged to tolerate the use of its technology, unless it has allowed such use or was under an obligation to allow such use, as a consequence of holding a dominant market position Ibid, para. 146.
An abuse of market dominance by the enforcement of patent rights does not occur, if the patent holder complies with its duties under the Huawei framework [7] . These duties presuppose, however, that the implementer, who already uses the protected technology without authorization by the right holder, is willing to take a licence on FRAND terms [8] . The Court explained that it cannot be requested by the patent holder to 'impose' a licence to any standards user, not least because it has no legal claim to request the signing of a licensing agreement [8] . Moreover, the 'particular responsibility' attached to its dominant position requires from the SEP holder to make 'sufficient efforts' to facilitate the signing of an agreement towards a licensee in principle willing to take a licence [9] .
Notification of infringement
According to the Court, these 'efforts' include a duty to notify the implementer about the infringement of the patent(s) involved as well as the possibility and need to take a licence prior to filing an infringement action Ibid, para. 152. Looking at the specific case, the Court found that Nokia met this obligation Ibid, paras. 151-156.
In terms of content, the notification of infringement must name the patent infringed and describe the specific infringing use and the attacked embodiments [10] . A detailed technical and legal analysis of the infringement is not required: the implementer should only be placed in a position to evaluate the infringement allegation, eventually by taking recourse to expert and/or legal advice [10] . As a rule, presenting claim charts will be sufficient (but not mandatory) [10] . The Court also pointed out that the patent holder is not required to address a separate notification of infringement to each supplier of an end-device manufactures infringing its patents [12] .
In the eyes of the Court, Nokia's e-mails dated 21 June 2016, 9 November 2016 and 7 December 2016 meet the above requirements [13] . The fact that -at least initially- Nokia did not indicate the concrete section of the standards documentation to which the patent-in-suit referred to was not considered harmful, since the notification of infringement is not required to facilitate a final assessment of infringement [14] .
Furthermore, the Court held that it was not necessary for Nokia to identify in the notification of infringement the specific components which generate connectivity according to the relevant standard, e.g. the TCUs built into Daimler's cars [15] . Since Daimler purchases and uses these components in its products, no information deficit could occur [15] .
Willingness
Moreover, the Court found that Daimler did not adequately express its willingness to enter into a FRAND licence with Nokia and could, thus, not rely on a FRAND defence to avoid an injunction Ibid, paras. 157-231.
In the Court's eyes, the implementer has to 'clearly' and 'unambiguously' declare that it is willing to sign a licence with the SEP holder 'on whatever terms are in fact FRAND' and, subsequently, engage in licensing negotiations in a 'target-oriented' manner (citing Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 5 May 2020 – Sisvel v Haier, Case No. KZR 36/17 and High Court of Justice of England and Wales, judgment dated 5 April 2017, Case No. [2017] EWHC 711(Pat) – Unwired Planet v Huawei) [17] . The 'target-oriented' engagement of the implementer in licensing negotiations is of decisive importance: since implementers, as a rule, already use the patented standardized technology prior to the initiation of licensing negotiations, they could have an interest to delay the signing of a licence until the expiration of the patent, which, however, conflicts with the spirit of the Huawei decision [18] . Accordingly, it is not sufficient, in response to a notification of infringement, to just demonstrate willingness to consider signing a licensing agreement or to enter into negotiations about whether and under which conditions taking a licence comes into question [17] .
The Court further pointed out that making the declaration of willingness subject to conditions was not acceptable [17] . What is more, refusing to discuss about any improvement of a counteroffer made to the patent holder could also be considered as an indication of unwillingness from the side of the implementer [17] .
Based on the above, the Court took the view that by initially making the signing of a licence subject to the condition that its products actually infringe Nokia's patents, Daimler did not adequately express willingness to sign a FRAND licence [19] . The Court added that Daimler's counteroffers could neither be considered as a sufficient sign of willingness: especially the second counteroffer, giving Daimler the right to contest the royalty rates that Nokia would unilaterally set, would just postpone the actual dispute between the parties about the determination of the licensing fees to later court proceedings [20] .
The Court also held that Daimler did not act as an 'willing' licensee, since it did not engage in negotiations with Nokia, but insisted that its suppliers take a direct licence from the latter, instead [21] . Furthermore, the missing willingness of Daimler was also confirmed by its insistence on applying the average selling price of TCUs purchased by Daimler by its suppliers as base for the calculation of the licensing fees for Nokia's SEP portfolio [22] .
Calculation of FRAND fees
The Court found that the use of TCUs as the 'reference value' for the calculation of the royalty fees for Nokia's SEP portfolio was not appropriate Ibid, para. 169.
In general, there is not only a single set of FRAND terms and conditions; usually, there is a range of licensing conditions and fees which are FRAND [24] . Moreover, what can be considered as FRAND may differ from industry sector to industry sector as well as in time [24] .
The Court pointed out, however, that the patent holder must, in principle, 'be given a share' in the 'economic benefits of the technology to the saleable end product at the final stage of the value chain' [25] . Reason for that is, that the use of the protected invention 'creates the chance' to gain an 'economic profit' with the end product, which is based on the invention [25] . The Court did not agree with the notion that by considering the value of the patented technology for the end product SEP holders benefit from innovation taking place at other stages of the value chain [26] . The Court noted that there are several instruments available to make sure that this will not occur [26] .
Accordingly, the Court rejected the notion of using the so-called 'Smallest Saleable Patent Practising Unit' (SSPPU), that is the smallest technical unit integrated in a product, as base for the calculation of FRAND royalty rates [26] . The effects of patent exhaustion would prevent the SEP holder from participating in the value created at the final stage of the value chain [26] . Apart from that, this option would make it more complex to identify and avoid 'double-dipping', meaning licensing the same patent at several stages of the value chain [26] .
Having said that, the Court clarified that the above principle does not necessarily mean that licensing agreements should be signed exclusively with end-device manufacturers [27] . The Court considered that there are various possibilities to factor the value of the patented technology for the saleable end product also at other stages of a supply chain [27] .
Against this background, the Court found that the selling price of TCUs did not sufficiently mirror the value of Nokia's SEPs for the cars produced by Daimler, which are the relevant end devices in the present case [28] . The selling price of TCUs corresponds only to Daimler's respective costs [29] . Connectivity, on the other hand, allows Daimler to generate income from additional services offered to its clients, save costs and optimise R&D expenses [30] . Connectivity secures the chance to create this value [31] . In addition, the Court noted that the acceptance of the licensing model of the Avanci platform (which grants licences exclusively to car manufacturers) by several of Daimler's main competitors serves as a further indication that focusing on the value of the protected technology for the end product is reasonable also in the automotive sector [32] .
Non-discrimination
Furthermore, the Court found that the assertion of patent claims against Daimler by Nokia was not discriminatory and could, therefore, not justify Daimler's insistence that licences must be taken by its suppliers Ibid, paras. 201-212.
The Court explained that the patent holder is, basically, allowed to freely choose the stage of the supply chain, at which it will assert its rights [34] . The same is true with respect to patent holders with a dominant market position, since competition law does not per se limit this possibility [34] . What is more, a dominant patent holder is not obliged to offer all potential licensees a 'standard-rate' [34] . The non-discrimination obligation established by Article 102 TFEU intends to prevent a distortion of competition in upstream or downstream markets, but does not exclude different treatment of licensees, if sufficient justification exists [35] .
In the present case, the Court saw no indication that Nokia's claim to use the end-product as a royalty base could impact competition [36] . Especially the fact that in the automotive sector it is common that suppliers take licences for components sold to car manufacturers, does not require Nokia to change its practice, not least because the licences granted by the Avanci platform to Daimler's competitors show that the respective practice -which is prevailing in the telecommunications sector- has already been applied also in the automotive field [37] . Furthermore, the Court did not consider that the assertion of SEPs against end-device manufacturers could lead to limitations in production, sales and technical development to the detriment of consumers [38] . In this respect, the Court referred to so-called 'have-made-rights' which according to the ETSI IPR Policy should be included in a FRAND licence and allow component manufacturers to produce, sell and develop their products [39] .
SEP holder's offer / information duty
Furthermore, the Court held that Daimler could not justify its unwillingness to obtain a licence by claiming that Nokia had refused to provide sufficient information concerning its licensing offers Ibid, paras. 216 et seqq.
The Court pointed out that the SEP holder can be obliged to substantiate the FRAND conformity of its licensing request [41] . In case that the patent holder has already concluded agreements with third licensees on non-standard terms, it will be, as a rule, under a duty to disclose and present –at least– the content of the key contractual provisions in a way, which would allow the implementer to assess whether it has been offered different commercial conditions [41] . The scope and level of detail of the respective duty shall be determined on a case-by-case basis [41] .
Considering this, the Court expressed the view that Nokia had provided sufficient information to Daimler, by sharing –among other things– a study on the value of connectivity for vehicles and a licensing agreement signed with another major car manufacturer [42] . In this context, the Court denied that Nokia was under a duty to disclose licensing agreements with smartphone manufacturers to Daimler. The Court rejected the notion that the SEP holder's information duty extends to the full content of every licensing agreement previously signed and that the SEP holder is obliged to disclose all existing agreements [43] . Adding to that, the Court noted that licensing agreements from the telecommunications sector are not relevant for the assessment of FRAND conformity of licences in the automotive field [43] .
FRAND defence raised by suppliers
Apart from the above, the Court also highlighted that Daimler could not profit from the FRAND defences raised by its suppliers that joined the proceedings Ibid, paras. 232 et seqq.
The Court left the question open whether an end-device manufacturer that has been sued can, in principle, rely on a FRAND defence raised by one of its suppliers, or not. According to the Court, this would, however, in any case require that the supplier is willing to obtain a licence from the patent holder calculated on basis of the value of the patent(s) in question for the end-product (and not for the component it produces) [45] . This had not been the case in the present proceedings [46] .
The Court did not ignore that it can be challenging for suppliers to pass on the royalty fees paid to the SEP holder to their clients [47] . However, the contractual arrangements of third parties (here: the arrangements between suppliers and end-device manufacturers) should not, in the eyes of the Court, direct the SEP holder towards licencing agreements that do not allow a participation in the value created by the patented technology for the end-product [47] .
C. Other issues
Finally, the Court held that -contrary to the recommendation of the Cartel Office – there was no need to suspend the proceedings and refer certain questions revolving around whether the SEP holders' FRAND commitment establishes a direct claim for everyone within a value chain to be granted a bilateral licence (License-to-all approach), or just a claim to have access to the standardised technology (Access-to-all approach), to the CJEU.
The Court left this question open, since neither Daimler nor its suppliers were willing to obtain a licence on FRAND terms from Nokia based on the value of the protected technology for the cars manufactured by Daimler Ibid, paras. 253 and 291. The Court also noted that the fact that the patent-in-suit would expire in few years from now would also speak against ordering a stay of the proceedings [49]
[1] Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 18 August 2020, Case-No. 2 O 34/19
[2] Ibid, paras. 49-136
[3] Ibid, para. 138
[4] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13
[5] Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 18 August 2020, Case-No. 2 O 34/19, para. 144
[6] Ibid, para. 146
[7] Ibid, para. 147
[8] Ibid, para. 148
[9] Ibid, para. 149
[10] Ibid, para. 152
[11] Ibid, paras. 151-156
[12] Ibid, para. 248
[13] Ibid, paras. 153 et seq
[14] Ibid, para. 154
[15] Ibid, para. 155
[16] Ibid, paras. 157-231
[17] Ibid, para. 158
[18] Ibid, para. 159
[19] Ibid, para. 161
[20] Ibid, para. 197-199
[21] Ibid, paras. 157, 160 and 162-164
[22] Ibid, paras. 160 and 165-168
[23] Ibid, para. 169
[24] Ibid, para. 170
[25] Ibid, para. 171
[26] Ibid, para. 172
[27] Ibid, para. 173
[28] Ibid, paras. 174 et seqq
[29] Ibid, paras. 174
[30] Ibid, paras. 177
[31] Ibid, para. 180
[32] Ibid, paras. 187 et seqq
[33] Ibid, paras. 201-212
[34] Ibid, para. 202
[35] Ibid, para. 203
[36] Ibid, para. 205
[37] Ibid, para. 210
[38] Ibid, para. 213
[39] Ibid, para. 215
[40] Ibid, paras. 216 et seqq
[41] Ibid, para. 217
[42] Ibid, para. 218
[43] Ibid, para. 230
[44] Ibid, paras. 232 et seqq
[45] Ibid, paras. 234 and 236 et seqq
[46] Ibid, paras. 240 et seqq
[47] Ibid, para. 239
[48] Ibid, paras. 253 and 291
[49] Ibid, para. 291.
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